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Abstract
Vulnerability becomes a major threat to the security of many systems, including
computer systems (e.g., Windows and Linux) and mobile systems (e.g., Android
and iOS). Attackers can steal private information and perform harmful actions by
exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities often remain undetected for a
long time as they may not affect the typical functionalities of systems. Thus, it is
important to detect and repair a vulnerability in time. However, it is often difficult
for a developer to detect and repair a vulnerability correctly and timely if he/she is
not a security expert. Fortunately, automatic repair approaches significantly assist
developers to deal with different types of vulnerabilities. There are lots of work
to detect different vulnerabilities, and only few vulnerability repair approaches are
proposed to repair certain types of vulnerabilities.
In this dissertation, we first target on one type of vulnerabilities in Android
applications, which is cryptographic misuse defects. Cryptography is increasingly
being used in mobile applications to provide various security services; from user
authentication, data privacy, to secure communications. We propose CDRep, which
is a novel tool for automatically repairing cryptographic misuse defects. We classify
such defects into seven types of misuses, and manually assemble the corresponding
fix patterns based on the best practices in cryptographic implementations. CDRep
first detects and locates the cryptographic defects. It then automatically repairs the
vulnerable application based on the fix patterns that we generated. Such scheme also
indicates an inherent limitation that it is tedious to summarize fix pattern manually.
Following the first work, we further explore the feasibility of designing practi-
cal scheme to learn fix patterns automatically, which is VuRLE. VuRLE first learns
transformative edits and their contexts (i.e., code characterizing edit locations) from
examples of vulnerable codes and their corresponding repaired codes. It then clus-
ters similar transformative edits. Finally, VuRLE extracts edit patterns and context
patterns to create several repair templates for each cluster. VuRLE uses the context
patterns to detect vulnerabilities, and customizes the corresponding edit patterns to
repair them. VuRLE solves the limitations in our first work. It not only generates
templates automatically, but also targets on multiple types of vulnerabilities.
Two major contributions are achieved in this dissertation: 1) repair the vulnera-
bilities by employing the present automatic vulnerability repair schemes; 2) gener-
ating repair patterns of vulnerabilities automatically. The proposed repair method-
ologies are applicable to not only one type of vulnerability, but rather various kinds
of vulnerabilities. The proposed schemes are implemented as a prototype, which
can be used to automatically repair different vulnerabilities.
However, these proposed approaches focus on repairing the vulnerabilities that
exists locally (i.e., at user side). Some other vulnerabilities are caused during the
data transmission, such as authentication between client and server. This type of
vulnerability can only be detected while analyzing both client code and server code.
It is more challenging because some vulnerabilities can only be detected after run-
ning the program for several times.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Overview
The widely adaption of applications not only helps user save private informa-
tion, but also processes data that can only be read by specific people. Keeping
private information and data secure is one of the major themes of information secu-
rity. However, vulnerability becomes a major threat to those applications, including
computer applications and mobile applications. By exploiting different vulnera-
bilities, attackers can steal private information or even perform harmful actions to
computer systems. However, vulnerabilities usually survive for a long time. The
average lifetime of Android-related vulnerabilities is at least 724 days [47] and the
attack on software vulnerabilities usually lasts for 312 days [13]. It is difficult for
developers to detect a vulnerability if it is not exploited. Also, vulnerabilities are
difficult for developers to repair by themselves, since developers are not security
experts and they are unable to repair the vulnerabilities in correct ways. Automat-
ic vulnerability detection and repair approaches significantly help developers and
users to deal with vulnerabilities.
The vulnerability detection approaches are usually applied from three perspec-
tive: 1) leverage some common features of one type of vulnerability; 2) summa-
rize the pattern from the vulnerable code; 3) extract the code logic from the secure
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code that does not contain any vulnerability. The feature-based vulnerability detec-
tion methods are usually applied for Intrusion Detection System(IDS), which use
the collected common features to build a detection model [7, 67]. However, the
false position of most model-based detection methods is high, and it makes the an-
alyst difficult to identify the vulnerability. For the pattern-related tools, researchers
analyze a type of vulnerability and design several constrains. Based on the pre-
defined constraints, those tools are able to detect the corresponding vulnerability.
This approach is usually applied on the network vulnerability [72, 89]. Similar to
the pattern-related tools, detection tools that detects based on code logic also need a
pre-defined code logic [56]. A significant limitation of those detection approaches
is that they require an accurate pre-defined constraints or rules.
The design of vulnerability repair approaches also have some challenges. With
plenty of vulnerabilities being detected, only few of them are proposed to be re-
paired automatically. The repair difficulty comes from the fact that different vulner-
abilities have their specific vulnerability signatures [45, 15]. Therefore, it requires
to learn different vulnerability signatures and creates templates to repair them re-
spectively. The existing vulnerability repair approaches are mainly designed to re-
pair a specific type of vulnerability, such as buffer overflow vulnerability [46], and
component hijacking vulnerability [92]. However, different vulnerabilities may oc-
cur, which require different patterns. It is impractical to propose an approach for
each vulnerability.
To address the above problems, we target on several aspects:
• Automatic Code Logic Extraction. How to extract the programming logic?
• Automatic Rule/Pattern Generation. How to generate rules for different
types of vulnerabilities?
• Automatic Patch Generation. How to repair a vulnerability efficiently and
accurately?
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1.2 Research Objectives
In this dissertation, We propose several approaches to answer the above ques-
tions. Based on the programming logic, it is able to extract different repair patterns
for different vulnerabilities. These repair patterns are applied to construct effec-
tive repair schemes with the assistance of the state-of-the-art technology. We first
propose a tool to deal with one type of vulnerability (i.e., cryptographic misuse de-
fects). Next, we target on multiple types of vulnerabilities and design an approach
that learns vulnerability repair patterns and repairs those vulnerabilities automati-
cally. The details of these works are introduced as follows.
1.2.1 Cryptographic Misuse Repair
Automatic software repair is a branch of code synthesis. Code synthesis often
generates surprising code (i.e., alien code) [54]. To avoid this problem, we first
propose to designing a tool to repair cryptographic misuse defects automatically.
Cryptographic primitives are widely used to keep users’ private information secure,
and cryptographic misuses defects are remained unpatched.
To repair a cryptographic misuse defect, we apply this tool on Android appli-
cations (called app for short). Our tool can help users repair cryptographic misuse
defects to protect their private data. Since our tool is generated from user’s perspec-
tive, we repair the application at bytecode level. The technical challenge to repair
a vulnerability at bytecode level is to handle all the registers assigned to each val-
ue. We first summarize correct ways to implement cryptographic algorithms and
generate seven repair templates manually. Based on the repair templates, our tool
locates those cryptographic APIs, and then identifies misuses that are described in
the template.
By evaluating our approach on mobile applications, our results show that the
repair scheme is able to be applied on most vulnerable applications. It also reveals
some limitations: 1) Manual template generation is tedious and time consuming. To
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repair the other vulnerabilities, it requires to generate different templates manually
by analyzing plenty of human-written examples. 2) In mobile system, apps can
communicate with each other through Intent. Our approach assumes each app is
isolated.
1.2.2 Multiple Vulnerabilities Repair
In the first work, we generate repair templates to achieve automatic repair. How-
ever, manual repair template generation is tedious and time consuming. It is limited
to be applied to few types of vulnerabilities. Addressing the limitation of the first
work, the second work in this dissertation explores the feasibility of designing prac-
tical vulnerability repair scheme with the assistance of existing patched examples.
Although many prior efforts [90, 92, 32, 39] have been devoted to repair differ-
ent vulnerabilities and bugs automatically, but there is still no practical and widely
adopted solution up to now. This raises a question on the practicability of adopting
an effective pattern generation scheme in vulnerability repair.
In this study, we propose to learn vulnerability repair edits from repair examples.
Each example includes a piece of vulnerable code segment and its corresponding
repair code segment. Those repair examples are taken as input and edits (i.e., insert,
delete, update, move) are learnt to transfer a vulnerable code to its repaired code.
For each edit, we also extract its context (i.e., unchanged code that is related to the
edits), which is used to locate a vulnerability. We then cluster similar edits into
groups. Within those groups, we generate several templates by comparing each pair
of edits and replacing variable names. Unlike traditional repair approaches, our
approach targets on multiple types of vulnerabilities instead of one, and it is able to
generate templates automatically by learning those repair examples. Moreover, our
templates are generated semantically, which means that several templates may be
generated according to the programming logic for one vulnerability.
We apply our design to existing vulnerabilities, which reveals and identifies sev-
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eral limitations. The major limitation is that it requires large amount of examples.
Our future analysis indicates that it is possible to overcome these limitations by
analyzing program logic.
1.2.3 Authentication Misuse Flaw
To address the limitations mentioned in the first and the second work, we discuss
our future research direction in the fifth chapter. The limitations are solved from two
perspectives: 1) We analyze secure applications instead of vulnerable applications,
since it is difficult to identify whether an application is vulnerable; 2) We extract
code logic from the secure code, and generate secure rules to describe the correct
way to implement a secure implementation.
As the web applications have been widely used on both mobile platforms and
non-mobile platforms, we focus on authentication misuse flaw in our future re-
search. To achieve login scheme, several authentication protocols are applied on
Android applications. We first learn the correct ways to implement those authenti-
cation protocols and generate the corresponding rules to describe the correct imple-
mentation. Any code logic that violates any secure rules is marked as a vulnerable
code, that is, this code contains authentication misuses flaw.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a litera-
ture review which introduces some related researches about vulnerability detection
and repair. Chapter 3 describes CDRep as a tool to repair cryptographic misuse
automatically. To address the limitations of CDRep, Chapter 4 describes VuRLE
that generates repair templates and repair vulnerabilities automatically. Chapter 5
discusses our future research direction on authentication misuses of Android appli-
cations. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation and
discusses a few directions for the future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
As vulnerability has become a severe threat to users, lots of vulnerability detec-
tion tools are proposed. We summarize the closely related research work from the
following aspects. First, we describe vulnerability detection approaches from two
perspectives (i.e, non-mobile application and mobile application). Then, we intro-
duce several automatic bug repair tools, which include normal bug repair schemes
and vulnerability repair schemes. Finally, we demonstrate the detection schemes to
detect zero-day vulnerabilities.
2.1 Vulnerability Detection for non-Mobile Applica-
tions
The non-mobile applications include normal software applications, web appli-
cations that provide web services, etc. In this section, we only introduce the tools
that are applied to the non-mobile application written in C program or Java program.
2.1.1 Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Most recent detection tools to detect buffer overflow vulnerability [78, 28, 86,
57, 88, 24] perform symbolic execution and data flow analysis. TaintScope [78]
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performs dynamic taint analysis to identify potential checksum check points in C
program. It achieves the major tasks as follows: 1) Detect checksum test in test-
ed program; 2) Bypass checksum test when fuzzy-testing; 3) Reconstruct input
with valid checksum. By running some malformed inputs, it confirms the check-
sum points. TaintScope is able to found vulnerabilities caused by buffer overflow,
integer overflow, null pointer dereference, infinite loop, and double free call. Dows-
er [28] combines taint tracking, program analysis, and symbolic execution to detect
buffer overflow. Instead of analyzing all possible execution paths, Dowser applies
spot checks on a small number of code segments that contain buffer overflow vul-
nerability potentially, and tests them in turn. Code property graph [86] is proposed
to detect common vulnerabilities with graph traversals, such as buffer overflow, in-
teger overflow. It combines all basic program analysis schemes (i.e., abstract syntax
trees, control flow graphs, and program dependence graphs). Code property graph
exposes all information to describe the sources that are controlled by attackers and
sensitive operations that are executed. KPSec [57] enables to determine whether
a patch brings new vulnerabilities. It performs symbolic execution with static da-
ta flow analysis to locate the patch-related code. Based on the patch-related code,
KPSec tracks all security points along the path, and then identifies memory-related
vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflow, memory leaks) by applying multiple security
checks.
2.1.2 SQL Injection & Cross-Site Scripting
SQL injection [11, 8, 27, 40, 72] and cross-site scripting (XSS) [74, 41, 58] are
usually caused by invalid input sanitization.
Machine Learning related Scheme. Shar et al. [62] propose an approach with
hybrid program analysis. Instead of only mining the static code patterns, they also
preform dynamic analysis to extract the execution traces of inputs and sanitization
functions, respectively. By applying supervised learning and unsupervised learning
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method, they are able to build a vulnerability predictor. Shar et al. [61] use static
code attributes based on the existing taint analyzer. By analyzing the normal imple-
mentation code that is able to avoid SQL injection and XSS vulnerability, they learn
code patterns and extract a set of static code attributes. A prediction model can be
built based on the static code attributes.
Rule-based Scheme. Sunkari et al. [71] leverage HTTP request analysis to
build dynamic rules for the requests of normal web application. They extract the
request from every trusted user to summarize a set of attribute-value pairs, which
can be used to detect vulnerabilities. Sonewar et al. [69] also collect the web request
to generate a fixed query set for static web applications. The static mapping is
used to detect vulnerabilities. AMNESIA [27] uses model-based approach to detect
illegal queries before they are executed on the database. It uses static analysis to
build a model by using legitimate queries, and checks the generated queries against
this model. CANDID [11] generates a benign query structure by analyzing benign
inputs dynamically, and compares an unknown input with the query structure to
detect SQL injection attack. By combining static and dynamic analysis, Lee et
al. [40] propose an approach to remove attribute values of SQL queries at runtime,
which consists variables in form of string or numeric. It then compares SQL queries
with those filtered variables to abnormal queries.
2.2 Vulnerability Detection for Mobile Applications
Some vulnerabilities in mobile applications are different from the vulnerabilities
in non-mobile applications, such as component hijacking vulnerability. Componen-
t hijacking vulnerability allows an attack to gain unauthorized access to protected
or private resources through exported components. The other common vulnerabili-
ties, such as cryptographic misuses and SSL misuses, are being re-implemented in
mobile application and services.
8
2.2.1 Component Hijacking Vulnerability
Detection tools to detect component hijacking vulnerability [50, 55, 42, 80,
10, 43] usually describe a dataflow graph from an entry point to a sensitive sink.
CHEX [50] identifies the entry points of an application, and splits the application
code into a subset of code according to the identified entry points. CHEX then
tracks data-flows crossing and checks the existence enabling hijacking data-flows
through dependence graphs. CHEX focuses on finding data-flows between entry
points and API calls. To extract more complete flow information, Epicc [55] is
proposed to detect inter-component communication (ICC) vulnerability. Since apps
are interacted through ICC objects, it specifics a communication across every ICC
source to sink, which includes the location of the ICC entry point or exit point. Icc-
TA [42] tracks the propagation of context information among components to detect
ICC-based privacy leaks. It performs inter-component communication to taint and
track the sensitive data.
2.2.2 Cryptographic Misuses
Cryptographic misuses [18, 64, 44, 14, 87] are often caused by inappropriate
API usage. CRYPTOLINT [18] performs static analysis to detect common crypto-
graphic flaws in Android application. Six rules are pre-define to achieve a secure
cryptographic implementation. CMA [64] extends the implementation rules that are
used in CRYPTOLINT, and then builds several models for 13 secure implementa-
tion rules. ICryptoTracer [44] is applied on iOS applications. It traces the usage of
cryptographic APIs to extract the trace log and analyzes whether the cryptographic
API violates the generic cryptographic rules. Braga et al. [14] state the security re-
quirements for an instant message application, and then analyze its implementation
of cryptography.
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2.2.3 Authentication Protocol Vulnerability
Similar to cryptographic misuses, authentication protocol vulnerability [20, 33,
5, 30, 76] is also caused by incorrect implementation. MalloDroid [20] detects
SSL/TLS code that are vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle Attack (MITMA) in An-
droid apps. It checks the validity of certification, hostname verification, and secure
connect usage. Kim et al. [33] analyzes the Pseudo Random Number Generator in
Android OpenSSL architecture to identify whether the generated random number is
predictable. Alavi et al. [5] perform a study on Android web applications by target-
ing on several authentication behaviors, such as login, sign up, IP-changing. Dif-
ferent from the previous mentioned authentication protocol vulnerabilities, a code
injection vulnerability [30] is proposed, which exists in HTML5-based mobile app-
s. It causes code injection attack that attacker is able to extract user’s information
through SMS, Barcode, MP3, etc.
2.3 Automatic Bug Repair
As for automatic bug repair, it is illustrated from two perspectives, normal bug
repair and vulnerability (i.e., security bug repair).
2.3.1 Normal Bug Repair
As abundance of defects existing in softwares, repair approaches [39, 82, 38,
32, 53, 85, 37, 36, 6] are proposed to repair software bugs automatically. Gen-
Prog [39, 82] and HDRepair [38] perform genetic programming to generate patch-
es. Based on the input program and test cases, GenProg [39] applies mutation and
crossover operations to select the most fit individual to repair bugs. HDRepair [38]
automatically analyzes bug fix history to infer many graph-based fix pattern, which
are used to guide a genetic programming solution to generate high-quality patches.
The approach using genetic programming generates non-sensitive patches, relying
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on random program mutation operations. This limitation is addressed by PAR [32],
which is first proposed to generate patches based on fix patterns. PAR has 10 fix
templates generated by fix patterns, which are manually learnt from prior human-
written patches. However, manually summarized fix patterns is tedious and time
consuming activities. Fixing different vulnerabilities require different fix patterns.
It is expensive or even impractical to manually create specific templates or rules
for all kinds of vulnerabilities. LASE [53] is further proposed to learn fix patterns
automatically. It learns an edit script from two or more repair examples, and then
creates a general fix template for a bug. LASE is sensitive to repair examples, that
repair examples should be precisely classified to generate the most general pattern.
Recently, a syntax-related program repair tool, ssFix [85] is proposed. ssFix first
targets on the suspicious statements that are seems to be incorrect. It then extracts
the syntax-related statements. Based on the correct code, ssFix matches the expres-
sions and statements in the correct code with those in the suspicious statements.
S3 [37] leverages programming-by-examples methodology to synthesize a better
bug repair. It uses the feature with a higher rank from the perspective of syntax and
semantic.
2.3.2 Vulnerability Repair
Different from the approaches for normal bug repair, existing vulnerability re-
pair approaches [46, 68, 90, 66, 65, 92, 48, 9, 93] target on one type of vulnerability.
Since vulnerability detection and repair are complicated, which require to analyze
program flow to identify a vulnerability and a corresponding way to repair it.
Vulnerability Repair for non-Mobile Applications
AutoPaG [46] and FixMeUp [68] perform vulnerability repair approach on vul-
nerable code. AutoPaG detects an out-of-bound vulnerability and identifies its root
cause based data-flow analysis. By considering a manually created official patch, it
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generates a patch to repair the out-of-bound vulnerability. FixMeUp indicates con-
ditional statements of a correct access-control check to repair access-control bugs
in web applications. It automatically computes an inter-procedural access-control
template if a missing access-control check exists. It further transforms the access-
control template to repair vulnerable code. Instead of repair the vulnerable code, Yu
et al. [90] generate safe inputs to repair vulnerabilities, and DIRA [66] aims to erase
malicious packets to repair vulnerabilities. Yu et al. manually constructs input string
patterns and attack patterns. Through these patterns, they propose an approach to
repair string vulnerabilities in web applications. Based on the input-attack patterns,
they are able to compute a safe input, and a malicious input can be converted in-
to a safe input. DIRA focuses on detecting and repair control-hijacking attack by
blocking attack packets and repairing component with compromised application’s
state. It first detects control-hijacking attack, and then identifies malicious network
packets that will cause control-hijacking attack. If attack packets are received, it
erases the side-effects before the attack happens.
Vulnerability Repair for Mobile Applications
AppSealer [92] defines manually crafted rules for different types of data to repair
component hijacking vulnerabilities by using taint analysis. By applying dataflow
analysis, it can identify tainted variables, and further repair those variables based
on the defined rule. With manually crafted rules, RelFix [48] is proposed to fix
resource leak bugs on Android applications. By analyzing call graph, RelFix lo-
cates resource leakage. It then generates generates auxiliary variables to trace the
resources dynamically to prevent leakage. Different from repairing the vulnerability
in source code, Armando et al. [9] prevent a vulnerability, affecting a kernel-level
socket (i.e., Zygote socket), in application launching flow. They provide two ap-
proaches, i.e., Zygote process fix and Zygote socket fix, to check fork request in
Zygote process and reduce linux permissions for the Zygote socket. Instead of cre-
ating rules or patterns, Embroidery [93] transplants official patches (CVE source
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code patches) of known vulnerabilities, and then rewrites the binary code to imple-
ment Android vulnerability patch.
2.4 Zero-day Vulnerability Detection and Repair
Most vulnerability detection and repair techniques are proposed to apply on
known vulnerabilities. Some researches are performed on identifying and repair
unknown vulnerabilities [77, 60, 81, 91].
MemSherlock [60] identifies unknown memory corruption by detecting mali-
cious payloads. It is applied on source code level. By providing the corruption
point in the source code, other consecutive source code, and description of how
the malicious input exploit the vulnerability, MemSherlock uses these information
to detect unknown vulnerabilities. ShieldGen [81] is able to detect and repair un-
known vulnerabilities without any human effort. It has an oracle that can perform
zero-day attack. It detects unknown vulnerabilities by input attack data, and then
repairs the detected vulnerability based on attack data. Wang et al. [77] propose
k-zero day safety, which is a novel security metric to measure how many zero day
vulnerabilities are required to compromise a network. It achieves that zero-day vul-
nerabilities are able to be detected without any measurable information. Zhang et
al. [91] proposes a diversity network to improve the resilience of a software system
against unknown vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 3
CDRep: Automatic Repair of
Cryptographic Misuses in Android
Applications
3.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces an automatic approach to repair one type of vulnerability
(i.e., cryptographic misuse) in Android applications (called apps for short).
Mobile computing has become a fundamental feature in the lives of billions of
people, heralding an unprecedented reliance on smart phones and tablets compared
to any previous computing technology. With the trend of Bring Your Own Device
(BYOD), mobile devices are increasingly used to access and store sensitive corpo-
rate information. Thus, many app developers use cryptographic primitives, such
as symmetric key encryption and message authentication codes (MACs), to secure
communications. However, developers can easily make mistakes in implementing
and using cryptography in their mobile applications due to either a lack of crypto-
graphic knowledge or human error, and such mistakes often lead to a false sense of
security.
There are a few efforts in the literature investigating the problem of crypto-
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graphic misuses in mobile apps. Egele et al. [18] examined if developers use cryp-
tographic APIs in a fashion that provides typical cryptographic notions of security,
For example, indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) security
and cracking resistance. They found that about 90% of the 12,000 applications in
the Google Play marketplace that use cryptographic APIs make at least one mistake.
Shuai et al. [64] built a collection of cryptography misuse models, and implemented
an automatic misuse detection tool, Crypto Misuse Analyzer (CMA). They found
that more than half of the apps they examined suffer from cryptographic misuses.
Li et al. [44] designed a tool called iCryptoTracer which traces cryptographic usage
in iOS apps, extracts the trace log and judges whether apps have used cryptography
correctly. Veracode in 2013 detected cryptographic usage problems in the source
codes of mobile apps and concluded that such problems affect 64% of Android app-
s and 58% of iOS apps [4]. Given the significant portion of mobile apps affected by
cryptographic misuses, it is imperative that such misuses be rectified as soon as pos-
sible to avert potential attacks, such as brutal force dictionary attack. Unfortunately,
it may not be realistic to expect developers who misused cryptography in the first
place to do a good job in fixing the misuses because of their lack of cryptographic
knowledge or that they are simply unaware of the problem.
Our work aim to repair cryptographic misuses in Android apps automatically.
There exist a few efforts in automatically repairing software code in the literature.
Most of the previous works have focused on fixing general bugs, such as repair-
ing null pointer dereferences. Goues et al. [39] introduced an approach to repair
software programs using genetic programming. Kim et al. [32] proposed a nov-
el patch generation approach by first learning common fix patterns from human-
written patches and then generating program patches from these common fix pat-
terns. To our knowledge, very few efforts focus on automatic repair of mobile app
vulnerabilities. Recently, Zhang et al. [92] proposed a technique which generates a
patch for component hijacking vulnerability in Android apps; they performed static
analysis on bytecode to locate vulnerabilities, and then inserted new code to taint
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data and track and block dangerous information flow during runtime. Different from
Goues et al. and Kim et al., we focus on specific bugs that correspond to crypto-
graphic misuses. Their generic approaches have low success rates (e.g., only 27 out
of 119 bugs are successfully fixed by Kim et al.’s approach). In this work, we make
use of specialized domain knowledge to fix specialized bugs to achieve a high suc-
cess rate. Zhang et al.’s approach can also fix specialized bugs with a high success
rate, however, they focus on a different kind of vulnerabilities and their approach
cannot be used to fix cryptographic misuses that are considered in this chapter.
The automatic repair tool we propose, CDRep (Cryptographic-Misuse Detection
and Repair) which automatically detects and repairs misuses of cryptographic APIs
at the bytecode level in Android apps. We focus on bytecode level following Zhang
et al. [92] since we want to protect users who only have access to the bytecode
but not source code of apps. CDRep is designed to repair seven types of misuses
identified in [18, 64] and operates in two phases: detection phase and repair phase.
In the detection phase, CDRep locates misuses and classifies them following the
light-weight static analysis approach proposed by Egele et al. [18]. In the repair
phase, CDRep automatically applies and adapts a set of manually created patch
templates to repair a vulnerable program. These patch templates can be created
one time and used to repair many vulnerable apps with cryptographic misuses. We
apply CDRep on 8,640 real-world Android apps and it detects that 8,582 apps have
cryptographic misuses. We manually check a random sample of 1,262 apps from
the 8,582 apps and among the 1,262 vulnerable apps, CDRep successfully repairs
1,132 of them.
In a nutshell, the contributions of this work are two-fold:
• We propose and implement CDRep to automatically generate patches to fix
cryptographic misuses in Android apps. This is the first effort to repair cryp-
tographic misuses automatically.
• We apply CDRep to 8,640 real-world Android apps. We ask members of
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our security research team to evaluate the correctness of the automatic repair.
Moreover, we email the repaired apps to their developers to check whether C-
DRep inadvertently changes behaviors of repaired the apps. Our experimental
results show that CDRep is able to repair cryptographic misuses effectively,
achieving a successful repair rate of 94.5%. A total of 230 developers re-
sponded to our emails and 87.0% of them accepted our patches.
3.1.1 Applications of CDRep
Indeed, the cryptographic misuses could happen due to two reasons:
• Developer lacks the knowledge of cryptography.
• The Android app is developed by an attacker, which means the app is mali-
cious.
In view of the above reason, the cryptographic misuse vulnerability could not be
repaired from the developer’s perspective. If the developer lacks the knowledge of
cryptography, then it might be impossible for developer to repair the cryptography
misuses correctly. Further, if the Android developer is an attacker, the developer will
definitely leave the vulnerabilities which help the attacker collect users’ privacy.
These circumstances explain that we are unable to obtain the application source
code, namely, the cryptographic misuse could only be repaired on bytecode level.
Handling the repair by users and maintenance companies. CDRep provides
a reliable and easy way to repair cryptographic misuses. Users and maintenance
companies enable to repair the vulnerability without the source code of an applica-
tion. Moreover, CDRep provides the standard implementations for different cryp-
tographic approach. They do not need to have any knowledge of cryptography.
Processing the repair for a batch of apps. The minimum overhead helps users
and maintenance companies to process a batch of apps. CDRep assures the min-
imum changes of the app and the changes of the app and the minimum overhead
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to process the repair. There exist lots of apps that developers will not upgrade or
maintain. However, users might still use them. The maintenance companies could
use CDRep to fix the cryptographic misuse of those apps.
3.1.2 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the types of
misuses that CDRep intends to detect and repair. Section 3.3 presents the overview
of our approach. Section 3.4 elaborates the repair phase of our approach. Ex-
perimental results are shown in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses the limitations.
Section 3.7 concludes this chapter and describes the future work of our approach.
3.2 Rules of Cryptographic Misuses
In this section, we list the seven security rules that are used in our work, and any
application that violates any of those rules cannot be secure [18, 64].
Based on the precisely defined cryptographic algorithms, seven rules are pro-
posed by [18, 64] as follows:
Rule 1: Do not only use electronic codebook (ECB) mode for encryption [84].
Rule 2: Do not use a constant Initialized Vector (IV) for ciphertext block chaining
(CBC) encryption.
Rule 3: Do not use constant secret keys.
Rule 4: Do not use constant salts for password-based encryption (PBE).
Rule 5: Do not use fewer than 1,000 iterations for PBE.
Rule 6: Do not use static seeds to seed SecureRandom.
Rule 7: Do not use reversible one-way hash (i.e. reversible MD5 message-digest
algorithm).
18
Encryption schemes are used to protect user privacy, ensuring that attackers are
unable to extract even a single bit of plaintext from a ciphertext within a reason-
able time bound. Indistinguishability under a chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is
proposed to formalized this notion, and an encryption scheme could be defined as
secure if and only if it is IND-CPA secure [18]. However, some encryption mode or
wrong implementations make the encryption scheme become non IND-CPA secure,
such as using ECB mode and using constant value. Therefore, seven rules are pro-
posed to keep the encryption scheme secure. Based on the seven rules, we defined
seven types of misuse, and each misuse violates one of the rules of security. To
identify the misuse in a bytecode, we first examine the instruction that is related to
the misuse, called Indicator Instruction. Then, we locate the instruction that causes
the misuse, called Root Cause Instruction. We shows seven types of misuses below
and their the corresponding example bytecode. The root cause of each example is
set in bold.
Misuse 1: Only use ECB mode to encrypt. ECB mode is not IND-
CPA secure in symmetric encryption scheme. The bytecode be-
low shows such misuse. According to the indicator instruction,
Ljava/crypto/Cipher;→getInstance, we can identify that
register v1 holds the value of encryption type. Therefore, we are able to find
that value of v1 is “AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding1” based on the root cause,
which means that the developer uses ECB mode for encryption. Due to that
ECB is the default encryption mode set by Android, the developer also uses
ECB mode if they only define “AES” in their code.
1. const-string v1, “AES/ECB/PKCSPadding”
2. invoke-static {v1}, Ljava/crypto/Cipher;→
getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/crypto/Cipher
1AES is the cryptography algorithm chosen by developers. PKCS5Padding is the padding scheme
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Misuse 2: Using a constant IV in CBC encryption. In CBC encryption scheme,
a constant IV will generate a deterministic, stateless cipher, which is not IND-
CPA secure. The bytecode snippet below shows such misuse. Instruction,
Ljava/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec, is the indicator instruction
of this misuse, and we can conclude that register v7 is the IV parameter.
However, v7 receives the value from register v10. Thus, v10 holds the o-
riginal value of the IV, which is set as constant based on the root cause,
“1234567898765432”. However, the IV should always be set as random
based on the CBC encryption construction.
1. new-instance v7,
Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;
2. const-string v10, “1234567898765432”
3. invoke-virtual v10, Ljava/lang/String/;→
getBytes()[B
4. move-result-object v10
5. invoke-direct {v7, v10},Ljava/crypto/spec/
IvParameterSpec;→<init>([B)V
Misuse 3: Using a constant secret key. In a symmetric encryption scheme, if an
user uses a secret key with insufficient key length, then the attacker can extract
the secret key by using brute force dictionary attack. Moreover, if secret
key is constant, it will be extracted by using brute force attack. The sample
bytecode with a constant secret key is illustrated as below. According to the
indicator instruction, Ljava/crypto/spec/SecretKeySpec, we are
able to define that register v2 holds the value of secret key, and the value of
register v2 is “0x0”, which is constant.
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1. const/4 v2, 0x0
2. invoke-virtual v2, Ljava/lang/String/;→
getBytes()[B
3. move-result-object v2
4. const-string/jumbo v4, "AES"
5. invoke-direct {v3, v2, v4},
Ljava/crypto/spec/SecretKeySpec;→
<init>([BLjava/lang/String;)V
Misuse 4: Using a constant salt in PBE. According to [18], a randomized salt can
make PBE perform better. A constant salt makes the algorithm with salt
reduce to an algorithm without salt. According to the indicator instruc-
tion, Ljava/crypto/spec/PBEParameterSpec in the sample byte-
code shown as below, we observe that it uses PBE encryption scheme, and
register v2 holds a constant salt value, “0x0”.
1. const/4 v2, 0x0
2. new-instance v3, Ljava/crypto/spec/
PBEParameterSpec;→<init>([BI)V
3. const/16 v4, 0x64
4. invoke-direct {v3, v2, v4},
Ljava/crypto/spec/PBEParameterSpec;
→<init>([BI)V
Misuse 5: Setting iterations < 1,000 in PBE. Based on the suggestion
given by PKCS#52, the iteration should be at least 1,000 (i.e.
0x3e8 in hexadecimal). According to the indicator instruction,
Ljava/crypto/spec/PBEParameterSpec in the sample bytecode
2PKCS#5: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-
labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-5-password-based-cryptography-standard.htm.
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of misuse 4, it describes the situation where iteration is set inappropriately.
Register v4 holds the hexadecimal value of iteration, “0x64” (i.e. 100 in
decimal).
misuse 6: Using a constant seed to seed SecureRandom In [2], they show that
seeding SecureRandom may be insecure since seeding may cause
the instance to return a predictable sequence of numbers. If
the same seed is reused, the returned number will become repeat-
able. The indicator instruction in the code shown as below is
Ljava/security/SecureRandom;→getInstance. Based on the
indicator instruction, we can identify the root cause instruction and conclude
that SecureRandom is seeded by a constant seed, that is, the value of register
p0.
1. p0, [B
2. ...
3. const-string/jumbo v1, "SHA1PRNG"
4. invoke-static {v2, v1},
Ljava/security/SecureRandom;→getInstance
(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/security/SecureRandom;
5. move-result-object v1
6. invoke-virtual {v1, p0}, Ljava/security/
SecureRandom;→setSeed([B)V
Misuse 7: Using reversible MD5 hash function. Wang et al. [79] have found
many collisions in MD5 and created a powerful attack that can ef-
ficiently find MD5 collisions. Based on the indicator instruction,
Ljava/security/MessageDigest in the sample bytecode below, we
infer the root cause instruction and identify that register v2 contains the string
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of encryption scheme, that is, “MD5”, allowing us to conclude that it uses
MD5 hash function.
1. const-string v2, “MD5”
2. invoke-static {v2}, Ljava/security/
MessageDigest;→getInstance(Ljava/lang/String;)
Ljava/security/MessageDigest
3. move-result-object v1
3.3 Overview of CDRep
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Figure 3.1: Overview of CDRep
In this section, we introduce the overview of our automatic repair technique,
CDRep (Cryptographic-Misuse Detection and Repair). Figure 4.1 shows the work-
flow of CDRep. It has two phases, detection and repair:
Detection: In this phase, CDRep follows the detection steps of CRYPTOLINT [18],
which include decompilation and fault identification. After decompiling an An-
droid app, in the fault identification phase, CDRep checks if vulnerabilities exist
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in the app; if they exist, CDRep identifies vulnerable Java classes as well as their
vulnerability types.
Vulnerabilities are found by first locating indicator instructions (see Section 3.2)
in the decompiled code. Next, for each indicator instruction, CDRep identifies other
instructions that the indicator instruction is data dependent on. CDRep then checks
all such instructions to identify root causes that correspond to cryptographic misus-
es. For each misuse, CDRep records its type and the Java class that contains it. Since
this step closely follows CRYPTOLINT, we only briefly describe its intuition. De-
tails are available in the original CRYPTOLINT paper [18]. CRYPTOLINT detects
six kinds of vulnerabilities (misuses 1-6); in this work, we add one more vulnera-
bility (misuse 7). The procedure to identify the seventh vulnerability is the same as
the one used to identify the other six.
Repair: In this phase, CDRep fixes the vulnerable program by performing a series
of program transformations specified in a set of manually created patch templates.
Details of this phase is presented in Section 3.4.
3.4 Cryptographic Misuses: Automatic Repair
In this section, we elaborate the repair phase of CDRep. This phase requires a
set of manually created patch templates, which we describe in Section 3.4.1. Given
a vulnerable Java class and a vulnerability type, CDRep applies a corresponding
patch template to repair the class (described in Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Patch Templates
We manually create seven patch templates, each for a misuse type. To generate
these templates, we take a set of programs with cryptographic misuses and man-
ually fix them. Next, for each pair of correct and faulty program pairs (i.e., with
and without cryptographic misuses), we examine code that needs to be added and
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Misuse 2: Using a constant IV for CBC encryption 
Input: Vulnerable Java class Target 
  
Transformation: i Insert SecureRandom class to the default package of the app 
 ii Insert a new public IV addition  
.field public static ivParams:Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;. 
 iii [Encryption:] 
  1 § new-instance Pl2, Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec; 
  2  − const Pl1, * 
  3 § invoke-virtual {Pl1}, Ljava/lang/String;->getBytes()[B 
  4 § move-result-object Pl1 
  5 § invoke-direct {Pl2, Pl1},  Ljava/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;-><init>([B)V 
  6  + invoke-static {}, SecureRandom; 
    ->gen_ivParams()Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec; 
  7  + move-result-object Pl3 
  8  + sput-object Pl3, Target;->ivParams:Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec; 
  9  + invoke-virtual {Pl3}, Ljava/lang/Object;->toString()Ljava/lang/String; 
  10  + move-result-object Pl3 
  11  + invoke-virtual { Pl3}, Ljava/lang/String;->length()I 
  12  + move-result Pl3 
  13  + move Pl4, Pl3 
  14  + .local Pl4, "iv_length":I 
  15  + move Pl5, Pl4 
  16  + const/16 Pl6, 0x10 
  17  + add-int/lit8 Pl5, Pl5, -0x10 
  18  + invoke-virtual { Pl3, Pl5}, Ljava/lang/String;->substring(I)Ljava/lang/String; 
  19  + move-result-object Pl3 
  20  + move-object Pl1, Pl3 
 iv [Decryption:] 
  1 § new-instance Pl2, Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec; 
  2  − const Pl1, * 
  3 § invoke-virtual {Pl1}, Ljava/lang/String;->getBytes()[B 
  4 § move-result-object Pl1 
  5 § invoke-direct {Pl2, Pl1}, Ljava/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;-><init>([B]V 
  6  + sget-object Pl3 Target;->ivParams:Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec; 
  7  + invoke-virtual { Pl3}, Ljava/lang/Object;->toString()Ljava/lang/String; 
  8  + move-result-object Pl3 
  9  + invoke-virtual { Pl3}, Ljava/lang/String;->length()I 
  10  + move-result Pl3 
  11  + move Pl4, Pl3 
  12  + .local Pl4, "iv_length":I 
  13  + move Pl5, Pl4 
  14  + const/16 Pl6, 0x10 
  15  + add-int/lit8 Pl5, Pl5, -0x10 
  16  +invoke-virtual { Pl3, Pl5}, Ljava/lang/String;->substring(I)Ljava/lang/String; 
  17  + move-result-object Pl3 
  18  + move-object Pl1, Pl3 
Figure 3.2: Patch template for misuse 2: this template fix the misuse that use a
constant IV for CBC encryption
removed to transform the faulty program to the correct one. We then generalize the
added and removed code as a generic patch. A generic patch consists of a series of
code transformations. Each transformation corresponds to a series of code removal
and addition given a particular context. To make the patch generic, we replace actu-
al register/variable names, with placeholders. We also replace each constant value
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with a wildcard character (“*”) that can match any constant.
Figure 3.3 presents a sample template for transforming a Java class Target con-
taining cryptographic misuse 2, i.e., it uses a constant IV for CBC encryption. The
template contains 4 transformations: i, ii, iii, iv. Transformation i specifies the
insertion of the bytecode of java.security.SecureRandom class to the app (if it does
not exist). Transformation ii specifies the insertion of a field IvParameterSpec to
Target. Transformations iii and iv specifies code additions (marked by “+”) and
code deletions (marked by “-”) along with a context (marked by “=”). Each trans-
formation specifies that whenever a piece of code matches with the context, the lines
of code marked by “-” will be replaced with the lines of code marked by “+”. In the
two transformations, we have placeholders (e.g., Pl1, . . .Pl6 in transformation iii)
and wildcard characters (e.g., “*” at line 1 of transformation iii).
It is worth mentioning that cryptographic algorithms always appear in pairs (i.e.
encrypt and decrypt). Transformation iii is to fix the encryption method in the
vulnerable class and transformation iv fixes the decryption method. In transfor-
mation iii, we match for code Ljava/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec to
locate indicator instruction (line 5). Then, we replace code that is the root cause
of the misuse (line 1) with code that generates the randomized value (line 6-20).
The randomized value is stored in the field ivParams (line 8). Then we check the
length of the randomized value (line 11). Due to that the length is longer than
the required length, we only take the sub-length of the randomized value (line
15-18). Finally, the sub-length of randomized value is transformed to the place-
holder of IV. Similar to transformation iii, we also match the indiator instruction
Ljava/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec first in transformation iv (line 5).
Then, we locate the root cause in line 1 and replace it with codes that are used
to generate the randomized value. Instead of generating a randomized value, we
extract the value from the field ivParams in line 6. We take the same steps as tran-
formation iii to check the length of randomized value and take the required length
of randomized value (line 9-16).
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Table 3.1: Patch overview
Misuse Patch Overview
1 Using CTR mode.
2 using a randomized IV for CBC encryption.
3 Using a randomized secret key.
4 Using a randomized salt in PBE.
5 Setting iterations = 1,000.
6 Calling SecureRandom.nextBytes().
7 Using SHA-256 hash funtion.
Another sample template for transforming a Java class target containing cryp-
tographic misuse 5, i.e., it sets iterations < 1,000. The template only has one
transformation, modification. However, the modification transformation should
be applied on both encryption and decryption method. We first match the code
Ljava/crypto/spec/PBEParameterSpec;→<init> in line 4. Then, we
locate the root cause in line 3 and replace it with line 5 to modify the iterations to
1,000.
Misuse 5: Set iteration < 1,000 
Input: Vulnerable Java class Target 
  
Transformation: [Modification] 
 1 §new-instance Pl1, Ljavax/crypto/spec/PBEParameterSpec;  
 2 §sget-object Pl2, Target;->salt:[B 
 3  − const Pl3, *   
 4 §invoke-direct { Pl1, Pl2, Pl3}, Ljava/crypto/spec/PBEParameterSpec; 
     -><init>([BI]V 
 5  + const/16 Pl3, 0x3e8 
 
Figure 3.3: Patch template for misuse 5: this template fix the misuse that sets the
iterations < 1,000
Due to space constraint, we cannot show all the 7 templates. A brief description
of these templates is given in Table 3.1. A complete description is available in our
technical report [3]. Although the generation of these patch templates is manual, it
is a one-time cost and the patch templates can be reused to automatically fix many
cryptographic misuses.
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3.4.2 Patch Generation
In this step, CDRep takes a vulnerable Java class along with a misuse type as
inputs, and generates a patched class. To generate the patched class, CDRep picks
the corresponding patch template, runs a series of program transformations specified
in the template, and replaces placeholders with actual register/variable names.
Given a transformation, CDRep matches the lines of code marked by “=” and
“-” in the vulnerable Java class. In the process, the mappings between placeholders
and actual variable/register names are identified. The lines of code marked with “-”
are then replaced with the lines of code marked with “+”. Placeholders in these
newly added lines of code are then replaced with actual register names based on the
mappings that are identified earlier. Other placeholders in the newly added code that
do not appear in the mapping are replaced with new variable/register names that do
not appear in the vulnerable Java class.
An automatic code fix example for misuse 2 (i.e., using a constant IV for CBC
encryption) is shown in Figure 3.4. According to the transformation iii given in
the template, Figure 3.3, CDRep first matches the line of code marked by “=” (i.e.,
lines 1, 3, 4, 5 in the vulnerable code of Figure (a)). Then, CDRep performs map-
ping between the placeholders and the actual variable/register shown in Figure (b).
It is apparently that register v10 is mapped to placeholder Pl1, which is the root
cause. Register v7 is mapped to placeholder Pl2, which represents the IvParamter-
Spec. After mapping the actual registers, CDRep replaces the placeholders that
are mapped with the actual registers. For those placeholders that are not mapped
with any actual registers, we replace them with other available registers (i.e., v1, v2
shown in Figure 3(c)).
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1. new-instance v7, 
    Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;
2. const-string v10, 
    “1234567898765432”
3. invoke-virtual {v10}, 
    Ljava/lang/String;->getBytes()[B
4. move-result-object v10
5. invoke-direct {v7, v10}, Ljava/crypto
    /spec/IvParameterSpec;-><init>([B)V
1. new-instance Pl2, 
    Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;
2. const Pl1, *
3. invoke-virtual {Pl1}, 
    Ljava/lang/String;->getBytes()[B
4. move-result-object Pl1
5. invoke-direct {Pl2, Pl1}, Ljava/crypto
    /spec/IvParameterSpec;-><init>([B)V
1. new-instance v7, 
    Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;
2. invoke-static {}, SecureRandom;
    ->gen_ivParams()Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;
3. move-result-object v1
4. sput-object v1, Target;
    ->ivParams:Ljavax/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;
5. invoke-virtual {v1}, 
    Ljava/lang/Object;->toString()Ljava/lang/String;
6. move-result-object v1
                   ...
7. add-int/lit8 v2, v2, -0x10
8. invoke-virtual { v1, v2}, 
    Ljava/lang/String;->substring(I)Ljava/lang/String;
9. move-result-object v1
11. move-object v10, v1
12. invoke-virtual v10, 
      Ljava/lang/String;->getBytes()[B
13. move-result-object v10
14. invoke-direct {v7, v10}, 
      Ljava/crypto/spec/IvParameterSpec;-><init>([B)V
A)
B)
C)
Actual 
variable/register
Placeholders
v7
v10
“12345678987654
32”
Pl1
Pl2
*
Figure 3.4: Fix procedure for misuse 2: it uses a constant IV for CBC encryption.
A) shows the vulnerable code with misuse 2, and the template of misuse 2. B)
describes the mapping procedure between the actual variable/register extracted from
the vulnerable code and placeholders given in the template. C) is the fixed code by
replacing the placeholders by the actual registers that are mapped
3.5 Experiment
In this section, we present the details and results of our experiments that evaluate
the performance of CDRep. Our experiments are designed to answer the following
questions:
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Table 3.2: CDRep: Detection result
Misuse Type # of Apps Percentage Google Play SlideMe
Rule 1 887 10% 402 485
Rule 2 979 11% 379 600
Rule 3 882 10% 357 525
Rule 4 7 0.08% 4 3
Rule 5 10 0.1% 7 3
Rule 6 235 2% 17 218
Rule 7 5582 65% 1359 4223
RQ1 (Success rate) How many misuses can CDRep repair successfully?
RQ2 (Runtime) What is the average time needed for CDRep to generate a patch?
RQ3 (Size) What is the average increase in size of repaired apps?
RQ4 (Failed cases) Why can’t some apps be repaired successfully?
3.5.1 Experiment Setup
Dataset. To evaluate CDRep, we crawled apps from two app stores, Google play3
and SlideMe4 (a third-party store). In total, we collected 8,640 free apps (2,114 apps
from Google Play, and 6,526 apps from SlideMe), sampled from all categories. S-
ince some sensitive categories (e.g., finance, retail, etc.) are more likely to use cryp-
tography algorithms, we sample more applications from these sensitive categories
than others (in a ratio of 5.5 to 1).
Detected Cryptographic Misuses. CDRep performs both detection and fix of cryp-
tographic misuses. Table 3.2 shows the number of cryptographic misuses detected
by CDRep across the seven misuse types.
Experiment Design. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach from three
aspects: acceptance rate, patching speed, and size of repaired apps. Acceptance rate
evaluates whether our patches are acceptable by security experts and app developers.
3Google Play Store: https://play.google.com/store?hl=en
4Third-Party store: SlideMe (http://slideme.org/)
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Patching speed evaluates the efficiency of our approach; if our approach takes a
long time to complete, users are less likely to use it. Size of repaired apps is also
an important factor that affects usability; if the size of the patched app increases too
much, users are less likely to use it.
To measure acceptance rate, we ask our security research team and applica-
tion developers to examine the repaired programs. Our research team can examine
whether the repaired implementations of the cryptographic functionalities are cor-
rect. However, they will not be able to conclude whether our patch inadvertently
modifies any other behaviours of the app in a bad way. Thus, we also email the re-
paired apps to their corresponding developers to get feedback on the app behaviours.
To measure patching speed, we simply measure the average time that our approach
takes to generate a patch. To measure repaired app size, we measure the percentage
of increase in app size after an app has been patched.
To measure acceptance rate, manual inspection (performed by our security re-
search team and app developers) is needed. Since this inspection is a time consum-
ing process, and many apps suffer from cryptographic misuses (see Table 3.2), it is
not possible to check all of the apps that we have repaired (especially for apps that
exhibit misuse 1-3, and 7). Thus, except for misuse 4-6 (for which we evaluate all
repaired apps), for each other misuse type, we randomly sample apps for manual
inspection. For misuse 1, 2, 3, and 7, we select 100, 110, 100, and 700 apps re-
spectively. We vary the number of apps selected for each misuse type, based on the
number of apps with cryptographic misuses of that type (we pick around 12% of
apps of a particular misuse type).
3.5.2 RQ1: Success Rate
In this section, we measure how many vulnerable apps are repaired successful-
ly. To make it easier for cryptographers and developers to examine the patch, we
not only give them the original vulnerable app and the repaired app that we have
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Table 3.3: Success Rate
# of Team # of Developer
Selected apps Acceptance Developer Response Acceptance
Misuse 1 100 91(91%) 21 13(61.9%)
Misuse 2 110 92(83.6%) 16 10(62.5%)
Misuse 3 100 83(83%) 23 18(78.2%)
Misuse 4 7 5(71.4%) 3 2(66.7%)
Misuse 5 10 10(100%) 4 4(100%)
Misuse 6 235 212(90.2%) 20 15(75%)
Misuse 7 700 700(100%) 143 138(96.5%)
Total 1262 1193(94.5%) 230 200(87.0%)
repacked, but also provide the bytecode of the vulnerable and repaired apps. In ad-
dition, we describe the misuses in the app, and explain why the cryptographic code
in the app is not secure.
Table 3.3 presents the acceptance result of our repaired apps. Overall, our re-
search team accept more than 94.5% of the repaired apps. Considering the email
responses, 87% of the repaired program are accepted, which means that the app
behaviors are not impacted by the repaired program. According to the result, the
patch for misuse 5 and misuse 7 are better than the other types. Our repaired app-
s are not accepted by all the developers, we explain the reasons in the following
section (Section 3.5.4).
3.5.3 RQ2 and RQ3: Runtime and Size
The average runtime needed by our approach to identify a misuse and generate
a patch, excluding decompilation time, is only about 19.3 seconds. The bulk of the
cost is in the generation of a patch which on average takes 14.6 seconds.
The increase in the size of the patched apps is negligible. Table 3.4 shows the
average increase in the size of patched apps for different misuse types. Across the
7 apps the average increase in size is only 0.667% of the original app size.
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Table 3.4: Average Patch Overhead of different misuse type
Misuse Type Overhead
Misuse 1 0.749%
Misuse 2 0.640%
Misuse 3 0.632%
Misuse 4 0.742%
Misuse 5 0.634%
Misuse 6 0.526%
Misuse 7 0.748%
3.5.4 RQ4: Unsuccessful Cases
From Table 3.3, there are apps that are not repaired successfully by our ap-
proach. We discuss the main causes as follows:
Popular libraries. For some apps, developers may call popular libraries. CDRep
identifies some misuses that exist in these libraries. For example, several
MD5 misuses occur in the classes that are provided by Google, that are, sev-
eral classes in the “com.google.android.gms.*” package. Although we have
repaired those misuses, some app developers rejected our changes since they
still prefer to use the standard classes provided by Google.
Incomplete repair: CDRep assumes that each method only contains code that us-
es one cryptographic scheme. For cases where this assumption does not hold
(i.e., a method contains code that uses multiple cryptographic schemes), C-
DRep could only repair misuses of the first cryptographic scheme. We find
that a few apps define more than one encryption scheme in a single method,
which causes the patch generated by our approach to be incomplete.
Incomplete decompilation: We use apktool to decompile vulnerable apps. How-
ever, we find that some apps with complex behaviours cannot be decompiled
well. Moreover, some apps reject decompilation. For such cases, CDRep
cannot generate patches.
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3.6 Limitations
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity. Aside from the limitations
corresponding to the unsuccessful cases highlighted in Section 3.5.4, there are a
few other limitations of our approach and its evaluation:
Focus on Android. CDRep is only able to detect and fix cryptographic misuses
involving cryptographic classes that come with the Android API. An app may
use other third-party cryptographic libraries or implement their own. CDRep
is not able to detect and fix cryptographic misuses for such apps. To detect
these misuses, there is a need to create new templates. This effort will pay off
if the third party cryptographic libraries are used by many Android apps.
Focus on Free Apps. In our experiment, we only evaluate the effectiveness of C-
DRep on free apps. These apps might not be representative of paid apps. The
implementations of paid applications could be different from those of free
apps and these differences may impact the effectiveness of our approach. In
the future, we plan to expand our study to evaluate the effectiveness of CDRep
on paid apps.
Focus on the Interaction. For some apps, they upload user’s data to their server
instead of keeping it locally. CDRep only ensures that an app could work
normally if it processes encryption and decryption on the client side. It might
break if this app shares the cryptographic parameters with its server, once we
modify the cryptographic method the client side.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter we propose a approach, CDRep, to automatically repair vulner-
able apps with cryptographic misuses. Given a vulnerable Android app, we first
perform static analysis to locate the misuse and identify the misuse type. Then,
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based on the misuse type, we apply a suitable patch template and adapt it to the
vulnerable program by replacing register placeholders in the template with actu-
al register names. Finally, we perform an optimization step to remove dead code.
To evaluate CDRep, we crawled 8,640 real-world Android apps and use CDRep
to identify cryptographic misuses and repair them. Out of the repaired apps, we
randomly pick 1,262 of them for manual inspection (by security experts and app
developers). The evaluation results show that CDRep can automatically repair the
vulnerable apps effectively – it is able to repair 94.5% of the 1,262 vulnerable apps
with an average patch generation time of merely 19.3 seconds.
There are several aspects for future work. CDRep aims to repair the crypto-
graphic misuse by using static analysis at bytecode level. However, detection with
static analysis is not complete.
Detect Self-Written Encryption/Decryption class. In the detection phase of C-
DRep, we detect the cryptographic misuse by using the pre-defined crypto-
graphic APIs that Java provided (e.g., Cipher.getInstance). However, some
developers might prefer to call the cryptographic function written by them-
selves instead of calling the existing cryptographic APIs. CDRep is unable
to detect the self-written encryption/decryption class.
Identify Constant Variable. We adopt backward data analysis to identify the con-
stant variable. However, it could only match the constant variable when it
is defined in the function. In some circumstances, value of the variable is
not set in the function, and it is assigned by the heap during runtime.
We will extend CDRep by applying hybrid analysis (i.e., static analysis and dy-
namic analysis). Static analysis enables to extract the cryptographic usage from the
code level, and dynamic analysis could capture the code behaviors at runtime. It
helps detect the self-written encryption/decryption class and provide a more com-
pleted data flow graph.
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Chapter 4
VuRLE: Automatic Vulnerability
Detection and Repair by Learning
from Examples
4.1 Introduction
This chapter repairs vulnerabilities in computer system instead of Android sys-
tem. In computer system, vulnerability is also a severe threat, which is difficult for
a developer to detect and repair a vulnerability. It motivates researchers to explore
practical design to detect and repair different kinds of vulnerabilities in computer
system, such as cross-site scripting (XSS) [78], component hijacking vulnerabili-
ty [92], etc. Similar to the previous work, those studies on automatic vulnerability
repair typically focus on one type of vulnerabilities. These studies require custom
manually-generated templates or custom heuristics tailored for a particular vulner-
ability.
Manually generating repair templates and defining repair rules are tedious and
time consuming activities. As technology and computer systems advance, different
vulnerabilities may occur and fixing each of them likely requires different repair
patterns. Unfortunately, it is very expensive or even impractical to manually create
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specific templates or rules for all kinds of vulnerabilities. The above facts high-
light the importance of developing techniques that can generate repair templates
automatically.
To help developers repair common bugs, Meng et al. [53] proposed LASE that
can automatically generate a repair template. LASE automatically learns an edit
script from two or more repair examples. However, its inference process has two
major limitations. First, it can only generate a general template for a type of bug.
However, a bug can be repaired in different ways based on the context (i.e., preced-
ing code where a bug appears in). Second, it cannot learn multiple repair templates
from a repair example that involves repair multiple bugs.
Under these limitations, this work explores of designing a practical scheme that
is able to generate multiple templates and learns patterns automatically. We design
and implement a novel tool, called VuRLE (Vulnerability Repair by Learning from
Examples), that can help developers automatically detect and repair multiple types
of vulnerabilities. VuRLE can be applied to repair both Android applications and
other applications written in Java. VuRLE works as follows:
1. VuRLE analyzes a training set of repair examples and identifies edit blocks
– each being series of related edits and its context from each example. Each
example contains a vulnerable code and its repaired code.
2. VuRLE clusters similar edit blocks into groups.
3. Next, VuRLE generates several repair templates for each group from pairs of
highly similar edits.
4. VuRLE then uses the repair templates to identify vulnerable code.
5. VuRLE eventually selects a suitable repair template and applies the transfor-
mative edits in the template to repair a vulnerable code.
VuRLE addresses the first limitation of LASE by generating many repair tem-
plates instead of only one. These templates are put into groups and are used collec-
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tively to accurately identify vulnerabilities. VuRLE also employs a heuristics that
identifies the most appropriate template for a detected vulnerability. It addresses
the second limitation by breaking a repair example into several code segments. It
then extracts an edit block from each of the code segment. These edit blocks may
cover different bugs and can be used to generate different repair templates. This
will result in many edit blocks though, and many of which may not be useful in
the identification and fixing of vulnerabilities. To deal with this issue, VuRLE em-
ploys a heuristics to identify suitable edit blocks that can be generalized into repair
templates.
We evaluate VuRLE on 279 vulnerabilities from 48 real-world applications us-
ing 10-fold cross validation setting. In this experiment, VuRLE successfully detects
183 (65.59%) out of 279 vulnerabilities, and repairs 101 of them. This is a major
improvement when compared to LASE, as it can only detects 58 (20.79%) out of
the 279 vulnerabilities, and repairs 21 of them.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents an overview
of our approach. Section 4.3 elaborates the learning phase of our approach and
Section 4.4 presents the repair phase of our approach. Experimental results are
presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the paper and discusses our future
work.
4.2 Overview of VuRLE
In this section, we introduce how VuRLE repairs vulnerabilities. Figure 4.1
shows the workflow of VuRLE. VuRLE contains two phases, Learning Phase and
Repair Phase. We provide an overview of working details of each phase below.
Learning Phase. VuRLE generates templates by analyzing edits from repair exam-
ples in three steps (Step 1-3).
1. Edit Block Extraction. VuRLE first extracts edit blocks by performing Ab-
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Figure 4.1: Workflow of VuRLE: 1) VuRLE generates an edit block by extracting
a sequence of edit operations and its context. 2) VuRLE pairs the edit blocks and
clusters them into edit groups 3) VuRLE generates repair templates, and each con-
tains an edit pattern and a context pattern. 4) VuRLE selects the best matching edit
group to detect for vulnerabilities 5) VuRLE selects and applies the most appropri-
ate repair template within the selected group.
stract Syntax Tree (AST) diff [23] of each vulnerable code and its repaired
code in a training set of known repair examples.
The difference between a pair of vulnerable and repaired code may be in
several code segments (i.e., contiguous lines of code). For each pair of vulner-
able and repaired code segments, VuRLE outputs an edit block which consists
of two parts: (1) a sequence of edit operations, and (2) its context. The first
specifies a sequence of AST node insertion, deletion, update, and move oper-
ations to transform the vulnerable code segment to the repaired code segment.
The latter specifies a common AST subtree corresponding to code appearing
before the two code segments.
2. Edit Group Generation. VuRLE compares each edit block with the other
edit blocks, and produces groups of similar edit blocks.
39
VuRLE creates these edit groups in several steps. First, it creates a graph
where each edit block is a node, and edges are added between two edit blocks
iff they share the longest common substring [26] of edit operations with a sub-
stantial size. Next, it extracts connected components [29] from these graphs.
Finally, it applies a DBSCAN [19]-inspired clustering algorithm, to divide
edit blocks in each connected component into edit groups.
3. Repair Template Generation. In each edit group, VuRLE generates a repair
template for each pair of edit blocks that are adjacent to each other in the
connected component (generated as part of Step 2).
Each repair template has an edit pattern and a context pattern. An edit
pattern specifies a sequence of transformative edits, while a context pattern
specifies the location of the code where the transformative edits should be
applied. To create the edit pattern, VuRLE identifies the longest common
substring of edit operations in the two edit blocks. To create the context pat-
tern, VuRLE compares the code appearing in the context part of the two edit
blocks. To generalize the patterns, VuRLE abstracts concrete identifier names
and types appearing in the patterns into placeholders.
The context pattern is used to identify vulnerable code, while the edit
pattern is used to repair identified vulnerabilities in the repair phase.
Repair Phase. VuRLE detects and repairs vulnerabilities by selecting the most
appropriate template in two steps (Step 4-5). These two steps are repeated a number
of times until no more vulnerable code segments are detected.
4. Edit Groups Selection. Given an input code and a set of repair templates,
VuRLE compares code segments of the input code with edit groups and iden-
tifies an edit group that best matches it.
5. Template Selection & Application. The most matched edit group may have
multiple templates that match an input code segment. VuRLE enumerates the
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matched templates one by one, and applies the transformative edits specified
in the edit pattern of the template. If the application of the transformative
edits results in redundant code, VuRLE proceeds to try the next template.
Otherwise, it will flag the code segment as a vulnerability and generates a
repaired code segment by applying the transformative edits.
4.3 Learning Phase: Learning from Repair Exam-
ples
In this phase, VuRLE processes a set of vulnerability repair examples to produce
groups of similar repair templates. The three steps involved in this phase (Edit
Block Extraction, Edit Block Group Extraction, and Repair Template Generation)
are presented in more details below.
4.3.1 Edit Block Extraction
For each repair example, VuRLE uses Falleri et al.’s GumTree [21] to compare
the AST of a vulnerable code and its repaired code. Each node in an AST corre-
sponding to a source code file can be represented by a 2-tuple: (Type, Value). The
first part of the tuple indicates the type of the node, e.g., VariableDeclarationState-
ment, SimpleType, SimpleName, etc. The second indicates the concrete value s-
tored in the node, e.g., String, readLine, “OziExplorer”, etc.
Using GumTree, VuRLE produces for each repair example a set of edit blocks,
each corresponds to a specific code segment in the AST diff between a vulnerable
code and its repaired code. Each edit block consists of a sequence of edit operations,
and its context. The sequence can include one of the following edit operations:
• Insert(Node u, Node p, int k): Insert node u as the kth child of parent node
p.
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• Delete(Node u, Node p, int k): Delete node u, which is the kth child of parent
node p.
• Update(Node u, Value v): Update the old value of node u to the new value
v.
• Move (Node u, Node p, int k): Move node u and make it the kth child of
parent p. Note that all children of u are moved as well, therefore this moves a
whole subtree.
For each sequence of edit operations, VuRLE also identifies its context. To
identify this context, VuRLE uses GumTree to extract an AST subtree that appears
in both vulnerable and repaired ASTs and is relevant to nodes affected by the edit
operations. This subtree is the largest common subtree where each of its leaf nodes
is a node with SimpleName type that specifies a variable that is used in the sequence
of edit operations. We make use of the getParents method of GumTree to find
this subtree.
To illustrate the above, consider Figure 4.2. It shows the ASTs of a vulnerable
code segment and its corresponding repaired code segment. Performing AST diff on
these two ASTs produces a sequence of edit operations which results in the deletion
of nodes V12 to V17, and the insertion of nodes R12 to R21 into the subtree rooted
at V3. It also produces a context which corresponds to the common AST subtree
highlighted in gray.
4.3.2 Edit Group Generation
VuRLE generates edit groups in two steps: (1) edit graph construction; (2) edit
block clustering. We describe these two steps in detail below.
Edit Graph Construction. VuRLE creates a graph, whose nodes are edit blocks
extracted in the previous step. The edges in this graph connect similar edit blocks.
Two edit blocks are deemed similar iff their edit operations are similar. To check
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for this similarity, VuRLE extracts the longest common substring (LCS) [26] from
their edit operation sequences. The two edit blocks are then considered similar
if the length of this LCS is larger than a certain threshold TSim . Each edge is also
weighted by the reciprocal of the corresponding LCS length. This weight represents
the distance between the two edit blocks. We denote the distance between two edit
blocks e1 and e2 as dist(e1 , e2 ).
Edit Block Clustering. Given an edit graph, VuRLE first extracts connected com-
ponents [29] from it. For every connected component, VuRLE clusters edit blocks
appearing in it.
To cluster edit blocks in a connected component (CC ), VuRLE follows a
DBscan-inspired clustering algorithm. It takes in two parameters: ε (maximum
cluster radius) and ρ (minimum cluster size). Based on these two parameters,
VuRLE returns the following edit groups (EGS ):
EGS (CC ) = {Nε(ei) | ei ∈ CC ∧ |Nε(ei)| ≥ ρ} (4.1)
In the above equation, Nε(ei) represents a set of edit blocks in CC whose dis-
tance to ei is at most ε. Formally, it is defined as:
Nε(ei) = {ej ∈ CC | dist(ei, ej) ≤ ε} (4.2)
The value of ρ is set to be 2 to avoid generating groups consisting of only one
edit block. The value of ε is decided by following Kreutzer et al.’s code clustering
method [34]. Their heuristic has been shown to work well in their experiments. The
detailed steps are as follows:
1. Given an edit graph, VuRLE first computes the distance between each con-
nected edit block. Two edit blocks that are not connected in the edit graph has
an infinite distance between them.
2. VuRLE then orders the distances in ascending order. Let 〈d1, d2, ..., dn〉 be
43
the ordered sequence of those distances.
3. VuRLE finally sets the value of ε by finding the largest gap between two
consecutive distances d〈j+1〉 and d〈j〉 in the ordered sequence. Formally, ε is
set as ε = d〈j∗〉, where j∗ = argmax1≤j≤n(
d〈j+1〉
d〈j〉 ).
To illustrate the above process, Figure 4.3 presents two connected components
(CCs), {E1, E2, E3, E5, E6} and {E0, E7}. VuRLE first orders the distances into
[0.12, 0.14, 0.17, 0.25]. It then computes the largest gap between two consecutive
distances, and identifies a suitable value of ε, which is 0.17. Based on ε = 0.17 and
ρ = 2, VuRLE creates two groups of edit blocks for the first CC: {E1, E2, E3}, and
{E5, E6}. It generates none for the second CC.
4.3.3 Templates Generation
For each edit group, VuRLE identifies pairs of edit blocks that are adjacent nodes
in the edit graph. For each of these edit pairs, it creates a repair template. A repair
template consists of an edit pattern, which specifies a sequence of transformative
edits, and a context pattern, which specifies where the edits should be applied.
To create an edit pattern from a pair of edit blocks, VuRLE compares the edit
operation sequences of the two edit blocks. It then extracts the longest common
substring (LCS) from the two sequences. This LCS is the edit pattern.
To create a context pattern from a pair of edit blocks, VuRLE processes the
context of each edit block. Each context is a subtree. Given a pair of edit block
contexts (which is a pair of AST subtrees, ST1 and ST2), VuRLE proceeds in the
following steps:
1. VuRLE performs pre-order traversal on ST1 and ST2.
2. For each subtree, it extracts an ordered set of paths from the root of the subtree
to each of its leaf nodes. The two ordered sets PS1 and PS2 represent the
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context of ST1 and ST2 respectively. We refer to each of these paths as a
concrete context sequence.
3. VuRLE then compares the corresponding elements of PS1 and PS2. For each
pair of paths, if they share a longest common substring (LCS) of size TSim ,
we use this LCS to represent both pairs and delete the paths from PS1 and
PS2. We refer to this LCS as an abstract context sequence.
4. VuRLE uses the remaining concrete sequences and identified abstract se-
quences as the context pattern.
As a final step, for each template, VuRLE replaces all concrete identifier types
and names with placeholders. All occurrences of the same identifier type or name
will be replaced by the same placeholder.
Figure 4.4 illustrates how VuRLE generates a context pattern by comparing two
contexts. VuRLE performs pre-order traversal on AST subtrees of context 1 and
context 2, generating an ordered set of paths for each context. After comparing the
two set, VuRLE finds the matching paths highlighted in gray. For each matching
pair of nodes that is of type SimpleName or SimpleType, VuRLE creates place-
holders for it. There are five matching pair of nodes fulfilling this criteria, which are
indicated by the dashed lines. Thus, VuRLE creates five placeholders named $V0,
$V1, $V2, $T0, and $M0 from them.
4.4 Repair Phase: Repairing Vulnerable Applica-
tions
In this phase, VuRLE uses repair templates generated in the learning phase to
detect whether an input code is vulnerable and simultaneously applies appropriate
edits to repair the vulnerability. The two steps involved in this phase (Edit Group
Selection and Template Selection) are presented in more details below. They are
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performed iteratively until VuRLE can no longer detect any vulnerability.
4.4.1 Edit Group Selection
To detect whether an input code is vulnerable, VuRLE needs to find the edit
group with the highest matching score. VuRLE compares the input code (IC) with
each edit group (EG) and computes the matching score as follows:
Smatching(IC,EG) =
∑
T∈templates(EG)
Smatching(IC, T ) (4.3)
In the above equation, templates(EG) is the set of templates corresponding to
edit group EG, and Smatching(IC, T ) is the matching score between template T and
IC. VuRLE computes the matching score between the template T and input code
IC as follows:
1. VuRLE first generates an AST of the input code.
2. VuRLE performs pre-order traversal on this AST to produce an ordered set of
paths. Each path is a sequence of AST nodes from the root of the AST to one
of its leaf node. Let us denote this as IP .
3. VuRLE compares IP with the context of template T . If sequences in T can be
matched with sequences in IP , the number of matching nodes is returned as a
matching score. Abstract sequences need to be fully matched, while concrete
sequences only need to be partially matched. Otherwise, the matching score
is 0.
4.4.2 Template Selection
In the most matched edit group EG, there are likely to be multiple correspond-
ing templates (i.e., templates(EG) has more than one member). In this final step,
we need to pick the most suitable template.
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To find a suitable template, VuRLE orders templates in a descending order ac-
cording to their matching scores and tries to apply templates in templates(EG)
one-by-one. To apply a template, VuRLE first finds a code segment whose context
matches with the context of the template. It then replaces all placeholders in the
template with concrete variable names and types that appear in the context of the
code segment. Next, VuRLE applies each transformative edits specified in the edit
operation sequence of the template to the code segment.
If the application of a template results in redundant code, VuRLE proceeds to
try the next template. The template selection step ends when one of the templates
can be applied without creating redundant code. The code segment where the tem-
plate is applied to is marked as being vulnerable and the resultant code after the
transformative edits in the template is applied is the corresponding repaired code.
4.5 Evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of VuRLE by answering two questions
below:
RQ1 (Vulnerability Detection) How effective is VuRLE in detecting whether a
code is vulnerable?
RQ2 (Vulnerability Repair) How effective is VuRLE in repairing the detect-
ed vulnerable codes? Why some vulnerable codes cannot be repaired by
VuRLE?
The following sections first describe the settings of our experiments, followed
by the results of the experiments which answer the above two questions.
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Table 4.1: Types of Vulnerabilities in Our Dataset
Vulnerability Type Description
Unreleased Resource Failing to release a resource [52] before reusing it.
It increases a system’s susceptibility to Denial of
Service (DoS) attack.
Cryptographic Vulnerability Inappropriate usage of encryption algorithm [18, 51]
or usage of Plaintext Password Storage. It increases
a system’s susceptibility to Chosen-Plaintext Attack
(CPA), brute force attack, etc.
Unchecked Return Value Ignoring a method’s return value. It may cause an
unexpected state and program logic, and possibly
a privilege escalation bug.
Improper Error Handling Showing an inappropriate error handling message.
It may cause a privacy leakage, which reveals useful
information to potential attackers.
SSL Vulnerability Unchecked hostnames or certificates [25, 20]. It
makes a system susceptible to eavesdroppings and
Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
SQL Injection Vulnerability Unchecked input of SQL. It makes a system
susceptible to SQL injection attack, which allows
attackers to inject or execute SQL command via
the input data [49].
4.5.1 Experiment Setup
Dataset. We collect 48 applications written in Java from GitHub1 that have more
than 400 stars. These applications consist of Android, web, word-processing and
multimedia applications. The size of Android applications range from 3-70 MB
while the size of other applications are about 200 MB. Among these applications,
we identify vulnerabilities that affects them by manually analyzing commits from
each application’s repository. In total, we find 279 vulnerabilities. These vulnera-
bilities belong to several vulnerable types listed in Table 4.1.
Experiment Design. We use 10-fold cross validation to evaluate the performance
of VuRLE. First, we split the data into 10 groups (each containing roughly 28 vul-
1Github: https://github.com/
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Table 4.2: Detection Result: VuRLE vs LASE
# of Detected Vulnerabilities Precision Recall
VuRLE 183 64.67% 65.59%
LASE 58 52.73% 20.79%
nerabilities). Then, one group is defined as a test group, and the other 9 groups as
a training group. The test group is the input of the repair phase, while the training
group is the input of the learning phase. We repeat the process 10 times by con-
sidering different group as test group. We examine the repaired code manually by
comparing it with the real repaired code provided by developers. Furthermore, we
compare VuRLE with LASE [53], which is state-of-the-art tool for learning repair
templates. When running VuRLE, by default we set TSim to three.
To evaluate the vulnerability detection performance of our approach, we use
precision and recall as the evaluation metrics, which are defined as follows.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
where TP is the number of correctly detected vulnerabilities, FP is the number of
wrongly detected vulnerabilities, and FN is the number of vulnerabilities that are
not detected by our approach.
To evaluate the vulnerability detection performance of our approach, we use
success rate as the evaluation metric. Success rate is the proportion of the correctly
detected vulnerabilities that can be successfully repaired.
4.5.2 RQ1: Vulnerability Detection
To answer this RQ, we count the number of vulnerabilities that can be detected
by VuRLE and compute the precision and recall on the entire dataset.
Table 4.2 shows the number of detected vulnerabilities, precision, and recall of
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Table 4.3: Vulnerability Repair: VuRLE & LASE
# of Repaired Vulnerabilities Success Rate
VuRLE 101 55.19%
LASE 21 36.21%
VuRLE and LASE. VuRLE successfully detects 194 vulnerabilities out of the 279
vulnerabilities, achieving a recall of 65.59%. On the other hand, LASE can only
detect 58 vulnerabilities out of the 279 vulnerabilities, achieving a recall of only
20.79%. Thus, VuRLE detects 215.52% more vulnerabilities compared to LASE. In
terms of precision, VuRLE improves over LASE by 22.64%. It means that VuRLE
proportionally generates less false positives than LASE.
4.5.3 RQ2: Vulnerability Repair
To answer this RQ, we investigate the number of vulnerabilities that can be
repaired successfully. We also investigate how VuRLE can repair some bugs than
cannot be repaired by LASE. We also discuss some causes on why VuRLE cannot
repair some bugs.
Table 4.3 presents the success rate of VuRLE and LASE. The success rate of
VuRLE is much higher than the success rate of LASE. VuRLE successfully repairs
101 vulnerabilities (55.19%), and LASE can only repairs 21 vulnerabilities, with
a success rate of 36.21%. Thus, VuRLE can repair 380.95% more vulnerabilities
compared to LASE. In terms of success rate, it improves over LASE by 52.42%.
Figure 4.5 provides a repair example generated by LASE and VuRLE on the
same input code. The piece of code in the example contains a vulnerability that
allows any hostname to be valid. LASE generates an overly general repair tem-
plate, which only include invocation to setHostnameVerifier. It generate
such template since each repair example invokes the setHostNameVerifier
method after they define the setDefaultHostnameVerifier method, but
the definition of the verifier method itself is different. On the other hand, VuRLE
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generates two repair templates that can repair this vulnerability. One of the
template is for modifying the verify method, and another is for invoking the
setDefaultHostnameVerifier method.
Among 183 detected vulnerabilities, VuRLE cannot repair some of them. We
discuss the main causes as follows:
Unsuccessful Placeholder Resolution. When replacing placeholders with con-
crete identifier names and types, VuRLE may use a wrong type or name to
fill the placeholders. For example, the required concrete type is “double”, but
the inferred concrete type is “int”. Moreover, VuRLE may not be able to con-
cretize some placeholders since they are not found in the matching context.
Lack of Repair Examples. In our dataset, some vulnerabilities, such as Crypto-
graphic Misuses and Unchecked Return Value, have many examples. Thus, a
more comprehensive set of repair templates can be generated for these kinds
of vulnerabilities. However, some vulnerabilities, such as SSL Socket Vul-
nerability, only have a few examples. Thus, VuRLE is unable to derive a
comprehensive set of repair template to repair these kinds of vulnerabilities.
Partial Repair. For some cases, VuRLE can only generate a partial repair. This
may be caused either by the inexistence of similar repairs or because VuRLE
only extracts a partial repair pattern.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In summary, we propose a tool, called VuRLE, to automatically detect and repair
vulnerabilities. It does so by learning repair templates from known repair examples
and applying the templates to an input code. Given repair examples, VuRLE ex-
tracts edit blocks and groups similar edit blocks into an edit group. Several repair
templates are then learned from each edit group. To detect and repair vulnerabil-
ities, VuRLE finds the edit group that matches the most with the input code. In
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this group, it applies repair templates in order of their matching score until it de-
tects no redundant code (in which case a vulnerability is detected and repaired) or
until it has applied all repair templates in the edit group (in which case no vulner-
ability is detected). VuRLE repeats this detection and repair process until no more
vulnerabilities are detected.
We have experimented on 48 applications with 279 real-world vulnerabilities
and performed 10-fold cross validation to evaluate VuRLE. On average, VuRLE
can automatically detect 183 (65.59%) vulnerabilities and repair 101 (55.19%) of
them. On the other hand, the state-of-the-art approach named LASE can only detect
58 (20.79%) vulnerabilities and repair 21 (36.21%) of them. Thus, VuRLE can
detect and repair 215.52% and 380.95% more vulnerabilities compared to LASE,
respectively.
In the future, we plan to evaluate VuRLE using more vulnerabilities and ap-
plications written in various programming languages. We also plan to boost the
effectiveness of VuRLE further so that it can detect and repair more vulnerabilities.
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Connected 
Components
Edit Groups
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E2
E6 E10.25
0.12
0.14
0.17
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0.17
E5
E3
E1
E2
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ε = 0.17
0.14
E0
E7
Figure 4.3: Edit Block Clustering: CCs to Edit Block Groups
public String MapIndex(List<File> files)
 {
   if(!files.contains(“Explore”))
  {…
}
Context 2
public static String FileInLog(Map map)
{
  if(!mapIndex.containsKey(map.id))
  {…
}
Context 1
Block: “”
Statement: “”
SingleVariableDeclaration: “”
SimpleName: String
MethodDeclaration: “”
Modifier: static SimpleType: StringModifier: public SimpleName: FileInLog
SimpleType: Map
SimpleName: map IfStatement: “”
SimpleName: mapIndex
MethodInvocation: “”
PrefixExpression: !
SimpleName: containsKey QualifiedName: map.id
Block: “”
Statement: “”
SingleVariableDeclaration: “”
SimpleName: String
MethodDeclaration: “”
SimpleType: StringModifier: public SimpleName:MapIndex
ParameterizedType: List<File>
IfStatement: “”SimpleType: List
SimpleName: List
SimpleType: File
SimpleName: File prefixExpression: !
SimpleName: file
MethodInvocation: “”
SimpleName: contains
CompilationUnit: “”
...
CompilationUnit: “”
...
SimpleName: Explore
String
$T0
String
String
$V0
String
isEmpty
$M0containsKey
Explore
$V2
map.id
$V1
mapIndex
file
Figure 4.4: Context Pattern Generation
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 HostnameVerifier allHostsValid = new HostnameVerifier(){ 
  public Boolean verify(String hostname, SSLSession session){ 
   return true; 
  } 
 } 
- urlConnection.setDefaultHostnameVerifier(allHostsValid); 
+ urlConnection.setHostnameVerifier(allHostsValid); 
 
(a) Patch Generated by LASE
 HostnameVerifier allHostsValid = new HostnameVerifier(){ 
  public Boolean verify(String hostname, SSLSession session){ 
-   return true; 
+   HostnameVerifier hv = HttpsURLConnection.getDefaultHostnameVerifier(); 
+   Return hv.verify(hostname, session); 
  } 
 } 
- urlConnection.setDefaultHostnameVerifier(allHostsValid); 
+ urlConnection.setHostnameVerifier(allHostsValid); 
 (b) Patch Generated by VuRLE
Figure 4.5: A Vulnerability Repaired by LASE and VuRLE
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Chapter 5
Future Research Direction: An
Empirical Study of Authentication
Misuses in Android Applications
5.1 Introduction
Vulnerabilities introduced in previous two chapters only exist in the user side.
However, there are some vulnerabilities that can only be detected during data trans-
mission, such as communication between client and server. This chapter introduces
our future research direction to detect authentication misuse flaws in Android appli-
cations. Based on the report published by OWASP [1] in 2016 and 2017, insecure
authentication has been the top-10 vulnerabilities in applications.
As the number of smartphones have been rapidly increasing used nowadays. A
smartphone has become a tool with multiple functions, such as socialising with oth-
ers, working, online shopping, by applying different kinds of applications. Most
web applications on smartphone []provide a login system, which requests for us-
er’s basic information(e.g., username, password, email, etc.). From user’s perspec-
tive, those basic information are provided to verify their identity. To establish a
secure communication channel, those basic information should be preprocessed be-
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fore transmission, in case of the man-in-the-middle attack. A security expert knows
the correct way to implement a secure “Challenge-Response” authentication. Most
developers of web applications are usually not security experts. Due to the limited
time and security knowledge, the “Challenge-Response” authentication may not be
implemented correctly in those web applications. Three types of authentication pro-
tocols that are mainly used in Android applications: authentication protocol with
shared secret key, authentication protocol with timestamp, and authentication
protocol with public key.
For the login system in a web application, most recent authentication vulnera-
bility detection approaches focus on input validation vulnerabilities [59, 17], which
causes cross-site scripting(XSS) attack and SQL injection attack. Some approaches
focus on password authentication vulnerabilities [75, 35] that are vulnerable to of-
fline dictionary attack and impersonate attack. XSS vulnerability and SQL injection
vulnerability are caused by improper input sanitization, which requires validation of
an external input. Logic authentication vulnerability [22, 63] is caused by improper
input assignment, such as authentication backdoor. It is related to internal value
assignment(i.e., an input generated by developers). Firmalice [63] applies control
flow analysis to detect a logic vulnerability(i.e., authentication backdoor). However,
the connection between a client and a server may also be vulnerable to eavesdrop-
ping, intercepting, or manipulating while authenticating. For example, the message
for “Challenge-Response scheme can not only be assigned by the data from an in-
ternal input, but also an internal input. We focus on two categories of authentication
protocol vulnerability, authentication logic vulnerability and request forgery vulner-
ability.
The reason why we apply the detection on Android platform is described as
follows: First, there are lots of third party application stores for users to down-
load Android applications. Due to the existence of the large amount of third party,
uploaded applications are not been checked carefully, that is, more vulnerable appli-
cations and malicious applications are uploaded. Second, our tool is written in Java,
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and Android is closely related to Java. Also, Google provides lots of authentication
related APIs. For example, the API GoogleSignInAccount.getIdToken,
which extracts user’s unique idToken that will be provided to server to authenticate
user’s identity. Third, Android is a open-source platform, and lots of open-sourced
tools are published to decompile an apk file and translate the bytecode into an inter-
mediate language, such as Soot [73], APKtool [83].
Our future research focus on detecting the incorrect implementation of authen-
tication protocols (i.e., misuses of “Challenge-Response” authentication scheme).
We detect the three protocols that are mainly used in Android applications, that is,
authentication protocol with shared secret key, authentication protocol with
timestamp, and authentication protocol with public key. By applying static pro-
gram analysis, we are able to extract the dataflow of a challenge or a response to
detect whether the “Challenge-ReSsponse” scheme is implemented correctly.
5.2 Definition of Authentication Protocols
This section explains common protocols of login. Generally, an authentication
contains two steps:
1. A sends a message, which includes her name and password, across the net-
work to B.
2. B verifies message (i.e., name and password) and starts the communication if
it is matched.
However, the exchange data between A and B is not encrypted by any cryp-
tographic integrity protection method. Three protocols that are commonly used in
an authentication scheme, is described below: protocol with shared secret key,
protocol with timestamp and protocol with one-way public key.
Protocol with Shared Secret Key Figure 5.1 describes two “Challenge-
Response” protocols based on shared secret key. By using the secret
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BA
Message
R
f(KA-B, R)
(a) Encrypted by A
BA
Message
R
KA-B (R)
(b) Encrypted by B
Figure 5.1: Login Authentication Protocol with Shared Secret Key
key KA−B shared by A and B, challenge R can be encrypted through a
symmetric encryption scheme (e.g., DES and AES) or be hashed into a
message digest as a result. In Figure 5.1a, A encrypts the challenge R from
B by using the secret key KA−B as fKA−B ,R. To verify A, B uses KA−B
to decrypt ciphertext and extracts the challenge R. Another authentication
protocol in Figure 5.1b, B sends an encrypted challenge fKA−B ,R to A. A
sends the decrypted challenge R back to B. Moreover, the challenge R and
KA−B can be concatenated. The result can be hashed as hash(KA−B, R).
Protocol with Timestamp In order to create a challenge R with limited lifetime,
an authentication protocol with timestamp is proposed, shown in Figure 5.2.
In this protocol, it requires that A and B have a synchronized clock, and A
sends a message with an encrypted current time. Then, B extracts the time to
ensure that it is validate. Moreover, this protocol is more efficient by reducing
the authentication to a one-round protocol.
Protocol with One-Way Public Key Figure 5.3 illustrates two authentication pro-
tocols. In Figure 5.3a, A uses her private key to sign challenge R as [R]A. B
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can verify A by using her public key. If R matches, verification is succeed.
Furthermore, B can use A’s public key to encrypt the challenge R as {R}A,
shown in Figure 5.3b. A extracts R by using her private key to decrypt the
ciphertext.
BA
Message, KA-B (timestamp)
Figure 5.2: Login Authentication Protocol with TimeStamp
5.3 Common Rules of Password Authentication in
Android
While the secure authentication protocol is precisely defined in Section 5.2, we
propose the question whether developers who use authentication protocols imple-
ment the authentication correctly. Using authentication protocols correctly can be
challenging. Several rules are defined as follows to implement various authentica-
tion protocols. In particularly, any application that violates one of the following
rules will not be secure.
Rules for Challenge-Response Authentication Protocols. Password authenti-
cation is the simplest “Challenge-Response” authentication protocol, We
have defined three general rules as follows:
Rule 1: Do not use password in plaintext to transit in the public channel without
any additional protection, such as SSL/TLS.
Rule 2: Do not use repeatable number as challenge.
Rule 3: Do not use predictable number in plaintext as a challenge if it is used alone
to extract a session key.
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Figure 5.3: Login Authentication Protocol with Public Key
Rule 1 forbids to use password in plaintext if a public channel is not protected by
any additional protection, such as SSL or TLS. The authentication communication is
vulnerable to password stealing and man-in-the-middle attack (MITMA) [70]. Pass-
word stealing is an effective method to achieve attacker’s goal. By launch phishing
attack, attacker can extract user’s password easily without decrypt it. Moreover, at-
tacker is able to launch password reuse attack by using both username and password.
Another threat is man-in-the-middle attack (MITMA). Suppose that an attacker has
fully controlled the data exchange channel (i.e., eavesdropping, interception, and
manipulation) [16], the attacker enables to eavesdrop the user’s information (i.e.,
username and password), even modify user’s information.
Rule 2 states that an authentication protocol should not use a repeatable number
as challenge. For each “Challenge-Response” sequence, authentication protocol-
s usually employ a unique cryptographic nonce as the challenge. It prevents the
authentication against man-in-the-middle attack and subsequent replay attack.
Rule 3 states that the challenge should be unpredictable and encrypted, if it will
be used to generate a session key. Since the challenge will be used to combine
with the secret to generate an unpredictable encryption key for this session [12], an
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attacker is easier to extract session key and decrypt all exchanged messages.
Rule for Timestamp-based Protocol. Each authentication is issued a timestamp to
ensure that each authentication is unique. We define a rule for timestamp-
based protocol.
Rule 4: Do not use a repeatable timestamp.
Rule 4 states that a timestamp for each authentication should be unique. Instead
of applying a three-round authentication (i.e., “Challenge-Response” authentication
protocol), the authentication with timestamp is more efficient to apply one-round
authentication. However, if a timestamp in form of hour/minute/second, which is a
repeatable timestamp that can be repeated on the next day with the same time, the
attacker is able to impersonate the user to communicate with server.
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Chapter 6
Dissertation Summary and Future
Work
6.1 Summary of Contribution
This dissertation makes contributions on learning fix patterns of vulnerabili-
ties and repair vulnerabilities of designing automatic vulnerability repair schemes.
Moreover, our future research direction are described.
Our first work introduced an automatic vulnerability repair tool. We focused on
cryptographic misuse defects, since cryptography is widely applied to protect user’s
data, especially on mobile platform. We introduced seven cryptographic algorithm
that are commonly used in Android applications, and then manually created repair
templates by analyzing a correct implementation for each cryptographic algorithm.
To repair a vulnerable Android application, we detected a misuse and identify the
misuse type by comparing the vulnerable code with every cryptographic misuse
template. The corresponding repair template was customized and applied to repair
the misuse by replacing variable names. Our result shows that our repair scheme is
lightweight to be applied to Android apps and it is able to repair those vulnerabilities
effectively.
In the second work, we made an attempt to learn repair edits automatically in-
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stead of generating manually. We used known repair examples, including vulnerable
code and repaired code, to learn repair edits of different vulnerabilities. Similar re-
pair edits were clustered into an edit group, and several templates were generated
from each edit group. A template was applied to the most matched vulnerability.
Our experiment result further showed that it is possible to learn repair edits and
repair multiple vulnerabilities automatically. This work has been published to Eu-
ropean Symposium on Research in Computer and Science
Finally, we proposed our future research direction that we plan to detect authen-
tication misuses on mobile platform. By analyzing the web application rules on
mobile platform, we identified several vulnerabilities that are caused by the incor-
rect implementation of “Challenge-Response” authentication protocol. In mobile
platform, three authentication protocols are commonly used, and we summarized
six authentication secure rules to help developers implement a correct authentica-
tion protocol.
6.2 Future Work
Designing a more effective and applicable vulnerability repair scheme is a sig-
nificant work to help developers and users to prevent to be attacked. In order to
form a more comprehensive dissertation work, we are going to cover more studies
in the final dissertation. In this section, we introduce the studies that we will do in
the future and present a concrete plan to finish them and the dissertation.
6.2.1 Future Work: Unknown Vulnerabilities Detection and Re-
pair
Authentication Misuses Detection and Repair
As authentication protocols are widely used nowadays, designing a usable and
light-weight tool to detect authentication misuses is the extremely important. Lots
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of secure authentication protocols are proposed for various of web services [94, 31],
but only few of them can be applied on mobile platforms because of the resources
and memory limitation. To implement a light-weight authentication protocol, de-
velopers have to follow the secure authentication implementation strictly. However,
most of them are not security experts that some implementations are incorrect. We
plan to propose a light-weight tool to detect the misuses of authentication protocols
on mobile platform. This tool is required to detect precisely and effectively.
Unknown Vulnerabilities Detection and Repair
Most previous works deal with known vulnerabilities detection and repair. We
also propose some approaches to repair some known vulnerabilities automatically.
However, unknown vulnerabilities are more dangerous that attackers can exploit it
and perform new attacks on an unknown vulnerability to steal users’ private infor-
mation. ShieldGen [81] detects and repairs unknown vulnerabilities. It uses zero-
day attack to identify those unknown vulnerabilities if they are vulnerable to those
attacks. However, the data patch generation is only performed on the input data. By
comparing an input with legitimate information, it is able to identify the incorrect
input and correct it. Since only few vulnerabilities that can be exploited by using
malicious inputs, patch malicious input only repairs specific vulnerabilties. We aim
to generate a model with several safe behaviors. We expected to use the model to
compare an input application those benign behaviors. If the input application has
different behaviors, we could assume this application is vulnerable. Next, we can
repair its detected vulnerable behaviors to safe behaviors.
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